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"Stacking" occurs when an insured recovers benefits by combining
multìple limits of a specific automobile
insurance coverage such as Uninsured

Motorist, Undednsured Motorist, or
Medical Pay under policies issued by
the same auto insurance company,
"Stacking'l applies to aggregation of
coverages by reason of multiple atrtos
insured under a single policy as well as
multiple autos insured under separate

policies as long as the autos are insured rpith the same company. Stacking issues arose with the marketing of
first-parfy Uninsured Motorist coverage in the 1970s which marketing was
spurred by the statutes such as Montana's Sec. 33-23-2OI MC,A. requiring
mandatory offer of UM òoveia$e.'
Stacking issues followed the availability of Underinsured Motorist coverage

in

., :.
passed

haps the , saddest and 'most anti-

mandatory liability protection statutes

consumer aspect of the amendments
is the public policy that they sup-

dre 1980s after states

such as Montana's Sec. 67-6-307
MC,t (incorporating the minimum
limis of Sec. 6L-6-103 MCA). Litigation of stacking issues duting the last
three decades reflects the fact that
homes once featured single
'A.merican
cargarages and sport three car garages
in the 1990s. The expansion of fleets

of

commercial vehicles gave stacking

issues additjonal importance in terms
of repercussions for insurers and buyers of business auto coverage.
The 1997 Lege (to borrow Molly
Iwin's terrn) passed two acts, Ch.263
and 495, L. 7997, amending the 1981

anti-stacking starute, Sec. 33-23-207
MCA., with the avowed putpose of
blocking' stacking of any aùtomobile
insurance coverage in Montana. Per-,
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planted. Since the Montana Supreme
Court first allowed recovery of multiple Uninsured Motorist timits in Su11r'van u. Doe, I59 Mont. 50, 495 P.2d
193 in 1972, it has consistently supported its stacking decisions with the
public policy statement that
insur-

ers should not be able to include in
policies language that defeats coverages for which the consurner has paid
a premium. In 1997, the legislature
tmmped almost 30 years of adherence
to that consumer-friendly public
policy with a statute that says insurers

may

in fact collect premiums

for

policies, v¡hose. language defeats the
coverage bought.
Nevertheless, reports of the
demise of stacking may be premature.
First, for an indefinite time, the state
courts will still be litigating stacking
issues fgr glaþant9 i"îaugi in agtã
¿ccidents and 'covered by insuiance

policies whose policy terrns were already underway at rhe dme of the
effective date of the 1997 anti-stacking
amendments. Second, Ch. 495, L.
1997, while clear in its overall intent
to prohibit stacking in all forrns, is
likely to be the subiect of challenge
in the courts on several grounds that
will be discussed later. Consequend¡
issues of stacking of auto inJurance
policy coverages will be relevant for
several more years even if the 7997
amendments are the effective death
knell for stacking in Montana. Consequently; counsel for insurance conswne(s'v¡ill need to know ¡vhat law
applies to each of three classes of
possible stacking claims as will be discussed below.
Some stacking history is important here. Under the aegis of a consistent public polic¡ the court, over the
past three decades, developed a wellreasoned and cohesive set of cases
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dealing

with stacking questions in

Montana. In 1972, when two police
patrolmen were injured in a head-on
collision with a¡r auto thief in BuLte,
the Montana Supreme Court allowed
them to recover UM benefits under

the'City of Butte's auto policy and
of their own single policies. SuLliuan v. Doe, 159 Mont. 50,
495 P.2d 193. Technically, that was

under each

that u¡ould later reach the Supreme
Court as Guiberson v. Ifartford Cas.
fns. Co., 277 Mont. 27g, 7 04 P.2d, 68
(1985), insured 14 delivery vehicles
with State Farrn, presumably under
some qpe of fleet polic¡ and claimant
Guiberson's lawyers were arguing that
he should be entitled to stack all 14
UM limits of 925,000 each for a total

UM

recovery

of

$350,000. Such

not stacking, since it involved recovery of a single limit on policies with
different companies, However, in
Chatree v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., et

prospects resulted in industry lobbying
which led to passage of the first "antistacking" act, Ch. 21,2,L.1981 codi-

P.2d 7102

The statute took effect in October of 1981 and appeared to block
stacking of all coverages but only in
those situations in which multiple

al, I81 Mont. 1,

59'J.

(1979), the co'rrt stacked three UM
coverages under a single policy where
the insureds paid separate premiums
to insure three motor vehicles with

USF&G. The court noted that UM
coverage is not dependent on the insured "occupfrg' th. vehicle rramed
in the policy and said that it depends
on the premiums paid and not on the
number of policies. The court held
that the attempt to resttict UM coverage to one limit by placing three vehicles under one :polict ,vjola_ted Sec.
33.23-207 MCA wìjòh mandates that
insurers offer UM coverage to protect
against t+j""y by owners ã, op.."torc

ñed in Sec. 33-23-203MCA.

vehicles were ínsured under the same
policy. It is interesting to note that,

in the years after the

Farrners Insurance Company placed

an insured's multiple vehicles under

of uninsured motoi vehicles.
Five months later, the court reviewed a casc in which a young
woman named Kim Kemp was killed
in a collision with an uninsured
motorist while a passenger in one
of two autos insured by Allstate in

Verrnont for UM.coverage under

in New York

separate premiums under

of

all

While insurers could tolerate
stacking where separâte premiums
were paid for separate policies, they
cotrld not abidc the result of Chatree
v. USF&G and Kemp w Allstate
which stacked coverages for vehicles
insured under the same policy. What
was worse, the employei in'a claim
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coverage where the autos were insured

all such coverages shall not

exceed

that of the coverage with the highest

limit of liability..." The court noted
that it had historically embodied in its
decisions stacking UM coverage the
public policy "that an insurer may
not place in a¡r insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage for
which the insurer has received
valuable consideradon." The court
rejected as irrelevant State Farm's
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undet separate policies.with the same
insurer. State Farrn's clause provided
that "the total limits of liability under

ln law, the only constant is change. As a Boscoe Pound Fellow you can help
make sure the changes are the r¡ght ones.

same

policy. The case became nationally
significant when the court stacked
the UM coverages under both policies
allowing Kemp's estate recove ry

Fatm Mut. Auto. fns. Co.,

Mont. 386, 862P.2d 1146, the court
declared void State Farn's "other
insurance" clause which prohibited
stacking of Underinsured Motorist

some$me eEse wÃEE"

a

paying

the

same policy but rçortedly charged
a single premium for UM coverage.
In 1993, ln Bennett v. State

shape tlre åaw,

single policy. Kemp's parents insured

three autos

statute, State

Farm placed an insured's multiple
vehicles under separate policies and
collected separate premiurrr-s, and

the same policy collecting sçarate
premiums, while USF&G and Allstate
placed multiple vehicles' under the

e kund

TOUNDATION
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position that such public policy
applied only to UM coverage which
is protected by statute (Sec. 33-23-201

MCA), stating that "the pu¡pose of
underinsured motorist coverage is to
provide a source of indemnification
for accident victims when the tortfeasor does not provide adequate
indemnification." The court reasoned

that the public policy that favors
adequate compensation for accident
victims is supported by the same
publìc policy considerations that
invalidated anti-stacking provisions

in UM coverage. Finall¡ the court
found that the insured should be en-

titled to a reasonable expectation of
coverage up to the aggregate
limits of the policies purchased.

UIM

The court limited the ability of
passengers who are not family members tg stack UM and Medical Pay

n

Chilberg v. Rose, 273
Mont. 414, 903 P.zd 1377 (1995).
There it upheld Mid-Cenrury Insurance Company's,UM' definition of
"insured" that required passengers to
be "occupþg" the insured vehicle
to recover bene6ts. The policies incoverage

volved covered the named insured
and "any other person while occupying your insured car." The court held
that Chilberg could by de6nition only
be an "insured" in the vehicle he was
"occupþg" as a pâssenger. It distin-

guished

its

decisions stacking UM

coverage tn Sayers u. Safeco Ins. Co.
ofAmerica, 192 Mont. 336, 628 P.2d

659 (1981) and

in Kemp,

supta,

because each passenger in those cases
\qas ân "insured" by definitions r.urder
those policies. The court, n Chilberg,
affirrned its history of allowing stack-

ing urd its long-time public policy
rationale of 'þrchibiting insurers
from defeating coverage which the
insured reasonably expected" þy

papng separate premiums], but noted
that a passenger like Chlberg has not
paid the premiums for the coverage
and has no such expectation.

In 1996, in Farmers AIIíance
Mut. fns. Co. v. Ifoleman,
("Ifoleman I') 278 Mont.274,924
P.2d 1375; the' court ruled that the
anti-stacking statute did not apply to
the non-compulsory Underinsured
Motorist a¡rd Medical Pay coverages.

The court deterrnined that the statute
applied only to a "motor vehicle liability policy'' and that the terrn meant
only the lìability coverages reqtrired by
stâtute. Under the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, Sec. 61-ó-301 MCA (which
inco¡porates requirements from the
Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act, Sec. 61-6-103[2] MCA), the
legislature requires per person, per
vehicle, and properry damage liabiliry
cover¿ge for protection of third
parties. The court recognized those
coverages as constituting a "motor

vehicle liability policy'' within the
of the anti-stacking st¿tute.
llowever, since the legislature also requires, as part of Montana's statutory
scheme, a minimum first-party Unin-'
sured Motorist coverage under Sec.
33-23-201MCA, the court also recognized Uninsured Motorist coverage as
a required or'compulsory .orrJrug.
which, was expressly, included and
could not be stacked under the antistackirig statutêI. Ultimatel¡ the court
determined Underinsured Motorist
meaning

coverage and Medical Pay coverage to
be "excess'? or,r'additional'Ì cóverages
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to which the anti-stacking statute did not apply and held
that the statute doesn't prohibit stacking of UIM and
Medical Pay coverage where separate premiums are paid
for each motor vehicle under a single policy.

r¡Ifoleman

f"

leÊt unanswered the question of

whether the insurer could prohibit stacking of "excess" o(
"addidonal" coverages through policy language. Ruck-

daschel v. State Farm Mut. Autu. fns.,285 Mont. 395,
948P.2d400 (199? didnot involve the 1981 anti-stacking
statute, because the insured sought to recover Medical Pay

coverage under three separate State Farm policies.
(Remember that the 1981 statute only blocked stacking of
limits for multiple vehicles under a single policy.) Each of
the policies provided for Medical Pay coverage of $5,000
but contained an amendatory endorsement which provided

that,

if

the insured had two or mote policies providing

Medrcal Payments coverage, then the "tota-l limits of liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy
with the highest limit of liability." The lærguage effectively
puqported to block stacking of the MedicaJPay covenge,
so that State Farrn offered only $5,000 under one policy.
Save for the fact that Ruckdaschel v. State Fann involved Medical Pay coverage and Bennett v, State Farm
rnvolved Undednsured Motodst coverage, the court found
the public polióy issues to be identical a:rd, in stacking the
coverages, quoted Bennett "An insurer may not place in
an insurance policy a provision that defeats coverage for
which the insurer has received valuable consideradon."
Ifohman f, Ruckdaschel" and the fact ¡hat Farmers A-lliance Mutual v. Ifoleman, 1998 ìvtont. 155, 9ó1
P.zd 174, (Ifoleman II) was pending on the isstre of
validity of anti-stacking pohcy language for "additional"
coverages, prompted the auto insurance industry to approach the legislature and seek to block stacking once and
for all. In fact, the legislature amended the anti-stacking
statute, Sec. 33-23-203 MCA, through two separate acts.

Ch. 263, L. 1.997, amended the stahrte for the er?ress
purpose of "Establishing Subrogatìon Rights in Motor
Velricle Policies," while Ch. 495,L. 1997 rvas designed to
prohibit stacking of any auto insurance coverage u¡hether it
is required or excess. !7hile passage of the rwo acts has
anti-stacking proponents gleeftrlly dggrg the grave for
stacking, Mark Twain's words about the reports of the
deadr being gready exaggerated may be apropos.
Recall that the 1981 statute, Sec. 33-23-203 MC,{.,
provided the follovrng coverage limits for vehicles under a

single "motor vehicle liability policy": First, the limit of
coverage for an accident was the lir-nit for the vehicle
involved in the accident. Second, if thc i¡rst¡red vehicle
w¿sn't in the accident, the limit rvas the highest limit for

arìy one vehicle insured under the policy. Third, limits
cotrld rrot be added together. Fourth, the polìcy could
contain limitati.rns, exclusions, or reducdons of coverage
"to prevent duplicate payment for the sar¡re element oF
loss." Firrally, Sec. 33-23-204, which rvas addecl in 1987,
dcfined r "motor vehicle liability policy" as that reqtrired by

Titlc 61, Chapter ó, (the required
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In Ch. .+95, L. 1997, the

legisla-

ftrre n-rade the followilrg ciranges to
that statute by addition a:rd deletion

of

langr.rage:

L.

Applied dre anti-stacking provisions to vchicle coverages under
multipie policies as u'ell as single
policies

2.

3.
4.

Forbade stacking regardless of
"number of policies issued by the
safile company" or the "number
of premiums paid"
-tpplied the antj-stacking langrrage
to "each coverage"
Provided that "for a specified cov-

erage" tìre insurer "shall cleady
iniorm or noti$" the ir.rsured in
\\'nüng of lLmrts

zurd

coYetage frorn one

5.

"n'hether the

policy

c>1'

motor vehicle may be added to the
coverage of another..."
Defined "motor vehicle liability
policy/' to include "all additional
coverages" includng U^4, UIM,

tion (2) applied to "anorher casuaìty
polìcy that provides coverage for an
urjr.rry that necessitates damages or
bene6t payments." Aside from those
chzurges, the legislature, in enacting
Clrapter 263,1eÊt the rest of the stature

intact including its reference

important

to note that

Chapter 494 delcted the 198L language including UM coverage under
dre prohrbition of stacking in single
policies while addrng UM to the de6nitjon of "motor vehicle liabiliry policy" in Sec. 33-23-204 to block stacking of that coverage in the future.
Ch.263,L. 7997 had a narrower
purpose. While Sec. 33-23-203 MCA
aireadv contaìned subsection (2) which
provided that "A motor vehicle liabil-

ity policy may also provide for other
reasonable Limitations, exclusions, or
reductions of coverage which are designed to prevent duplicate pa)¡ments

(mearnng, u¡der

P¡.ce

16

policy"

lfoleman, required

coverages only)?

Consider also the fact that the
same legislature passed Chapter 495
making no reference to the amendmerrts of Chapter 263.It is important
that the ts/o amendments and their
inconsistent implicit retentjon of past
stanrtory language were codified by
the Code Commissioner into a single
combined amended version of 33-23203 and 204 MCA. The enactrnent of
dlese rivo chapters and the Code
Commissioner's approach to codifi ca-

tion

raise several issues which are
to result in disagreement. For
instzurce, how is one to read the intent

likely

of the

legislatrrre

in

enacting each

Missnrrla

of

the two chapters insofar as each left
non-identical portions of the antistacking statute intact? Can one ar.¡¡.re
that language left intact in Ch. 263 rvas
intended to be the amended statute
and that the same is true of language
left intact in Ch. 495? Can one argr.re
that the legislature's work requires that
there be separate conflicúng codifications of 263 and 495?

Subsection (3) requiring notìce
by insurers will be a source of disputed
issues. !Øhat is a "speci6ed coverage"?

Is

there arly coverage that is not
"specified"? When does d.re insurer
have to notify the insured? W4rat is
the remedy if the insurer didn't
"cleady inforrn or noti$r the insured in

writing"? !ühat if the insurer ærd the
instrred disagtee as to when the insured was to be noti6ed? Does the

if the coverages "may be added" (an unlikely
happening), keeping silent if dre consumer will not be allowed recovery? Is
the insured considered noti6ed in wrir
ing because the policy akeady contains
anti-stacking language in the "other
insurance" clause or the "limitation of
liability" clause? Does the insurer
insurer only have to noti$r

have to give notice if the legrslature
said the coverages carì't be stacked,
but the policy la-nguage doesn't?

Note that Ch. 495, L. 1997 involves both an "applicabiLty" date and
an "effecdve" date. The applicability
date detennines to u/rich insurance
policy the amendments apply. Chapter 495 provided that the amendments
to Sec.33-23-203 and204 "applies to
all motor vehicle liability policies issued or renewed after [the effectjve

S nMrF{ARS

I

1

Octnher )9. lSqq

a

approvrng subrogation clauses and assuring that subsection (2) would apply
to "another casualty policy" while
leaving subsecdon (1) to apply to only

U pcoMrF{c MT Lrq
29-3

to

"motor vehicle liability policy" a.nd dre
de6nition of such policy which the
Montana Supreme Court had constnred in Farmers Alliance Mut. fns.
Co. v. Ifoleman, ("Iloleman f") to
exclude the excess or additional Medica1 Pay and Underinsured Motorist
coverages. What is the import of the
fact drat tìre iegislauve body, m Chapter 263,left the statute intact save for

a "motor vehicle liabiliry

and Med Pav

It is

for the same elernent of loss," Chapter
263 added "subrogalion" into the provisiorrs approved in subsection (2) md
added language to insure that subsec-

Insurance f.aw
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of this act]." The effective date of the act is May 2,
1977. Consequentl¡ earliest applicability date þeing any
date after May 2, 7977) is May 3, 7997 . The effective date of
the amendments, May 2, 1997, is the date the statute was

May 2,1998. Considering the deletions made by the 7997
amendments, it is possible the courts will face arguments
that neither deleted portions of the 1981 sratute or the 1997
amendments apply to some stacking issues. Consequentl¡
for a single policy issued May 2,1997 and covering multiple
autos for UM coverage, one could argue tlie 1981, statute no
longer blocks stacking (UM language removed effective
May 2, 1997 by Chapter 495), and the 1997 amendment
doesn't apply to that policy.
Note that the 1997 amendrpents retained the 1981
language approving "other" provisions 'ldesigned to prevent
duplicate pa)¿rnents for the same element of loss..." This
language indicates that the anti-stacking provisions under
subsection (1) of the statute are designed to prevent duplicate pâyment for the same element of loss. Courts construing the statute should be reminded that its overarching intent
is to prevent duplication of payrnent for the same element
of loss. Wise counsel will not be in a position of seeking
duplicate payment for the same loss. While insurance
contract law v¡ill allow duplicate payment under Medical
Pay coverage, tort law doesn't allow duplicate payment
for the same element of loss. The goal of a-n adequate
recovery is to get all damages paid once, and that doesn't
violate the legislative intent of Sec. 33-23-203 MC,A.. A
gtavely ìnjured plaintiff seeking to recover from his or her
own insurer, UM, UIM or Med Pay benefis where damages
ex¡eed all limits of coverage will be in the best position to

date

effectively amended, so that certain pertinent language from

the 1981 stah¡te was deleted and language from the 1997
acts was added and became effective but only for those
oolicies to which the amended statute aoolies. Take note. bv
the wa¡ that Chapter 263 states no effective date or apphcability date. Neither does Ch. 2I2,L.1981, rvhich is the 1981

anti-stacking amendment. If the 1997 amendments are
compiled in the same statute, rvhat is the applicability date
and effective date of that compilation?
Though the effective date of Chapter 495 was May 2,
1997, as L mltter of applicability, a¡ì auto insurance policy
issued on May 2, 1,997, would not be subject to the 1997
amendments during the temr of that policy. Hence, it is
possible that accidents occurdng as late as May 1,1998 (the
end of such one-year policy terrns) would result in stacking '
of coverages undet policies to which ¡he 7997 amendments
will not apply. Since such claims are now only ayear old and
many haven't yet been filed as lawsuits, litigation and appeal
of stacking issues may go on for several years.
Needless to'say, for accidents occurring during the May
2, 7997 to May 2, L998, v¡indow and perhaps six months
later, counsel seeking to stack should acquire the policies and
every nodce, rider, or endorse-1nent f¡om the insurer, so that
counsel knows the status of notice to the insured. Lack of
notice may be the key to'getting afavo:ø.ble court ruling on

(to page 24)
l

'stacking.

The first inquiry for counsel seeking to stack rpill be
what law to apply. The law goveming an auto insurance
stacking claim will'depend on the terrn of the insurance
coverage. Three scenarios exist depending on the policy
terrn. First, if the accident occurred under coverage of a
policy whose terrn began on or after May 3, 1997, then by
the provisions of the 1997 amendments, no coverage under
the polìcy can oe stacked. Second, if the accident occurred
under a policy issued before the applicability date of May 3,
L997 ud before the effective date of May 2,1997, then the
1981 anti-stacking statute and the stacking decisions of the
Montana Supreme Court would apply so that only stacking
of required coverages under a single policy would be prohibited. Third, whal of thg.,c4seg occurring on or after the
statute's effective daté of. May'2,' 1997 and under policies
tlrat did not expire until as late as May 2, 1998? For those
cases, the 1997 amendments would not apo_Ly, but the 1997
amendment was effective as of May 2, 1997 to delete some
provisions of the 1981 anti-stacking stahrte as of that date.
For example, Chapter 495, effective May 2, 1.997, deleted
from the 1981 anti-stacking stailte the language that previously included Uninsured Motorist coverage as a coverage
that cotrld not be stacked if multiple cars were under one
policy. To be sure, Chapter 495, L. 199? added language
blockfurg stacking for any coverage, but that language though
effective does not apply to tìre policy drat expires as late as
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argue the public policy and legislauve intent
after its amendment in 1997.

of the statute

Also, it appears counsel will raise issues about
whether the amendments impair rights in effect on the
effective d¿te of the legislation, which can be argted is
imperrnissible under ,A.rticle II, Section 31 of the Montana
Constitution. Ffence, as you can see, the 1997 legislative
rush to extend the anti-stacking statute to all coverages
may have produced inconsistencies, ambiguities, and issues in the codified result that can plague the attempt to
end stacking. Inventiveness of counsel in challenging the
newly amended statute in the effort to assure adequate
insurance coverage may create a hole in the anti-stacking
darn created by the 1997 legislature.
Finall¡ and very importantl¡ counsel should note
'tn
Dakota Fire fns. Co. u. OÍe, 1998
the court's decision
MT 288, 55 St. Rep. ll7g,:r;.which the court held that the
198L anti-sacking statute (as of 1991) did not apply to
block stacking of uninsured motori_st coverage of multiple
vehicles under a single policy wherê the insured paid
separate premiums. The court asked "to what extent did
the provisions of Sec. 33-23-203, MCÂ (1991), supersede
the doctrine of reasonable expectations and the public
policy recognized by this court favoring the enforcement
of coverage for which an insurer has received valuable
consideration." The court noted that the statute's lat guuge
made it apply t9 bloçk stlcþg l-_legardless of the number
of motor vehicles" but didntt address whêther the rrumber
of premiums paid made a difference; Of critical importance here is the implication that the public policy of the,
reasonable expectations doctrine and the court's long cited
public poticy of protection of insureds who pay multiple
premiums may prevail over a conflicting legislative enactment. The 6ght isn't over yet.

New Member Service

brain function abiliry. This means that it is practically
impossible to predict what type of cognitive impairments will result from a combination of bi¿in damage
and psychiatric illness, and the test results carmot be
looked at or analyzed in a vacuum.,

CONCLUSION

It is not, in
way,being suggested that every
person who is ln a^ny
cx crash, whether they strike their
head or not, has suffered a traumattc brain injury. I
hope that the content of this art-icle will be of assistance
for people in understa¡rding some of the realities about
traumatic brain injury and for helping persons surviving
traumatic brain injury to obtain the respect, dignity, and
care and treatrnent they deserve anl are entitled to.
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